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Summary: 
Small states can achieve influence and power in the international system by 
implementing some status-seeking strategies oriented to upgrade their relevance 
towards the hegemon. This essay will try to discern some ‘status markers’ in 
order to identify properly a consistent strategy and then it will be observed if 
Singapore, Qatar and Rwanda fulfil these markers. We will conclude it is 
possible to identify status-seeking strategies, and the analysed three countries are 
implementing their own in a similar way. Thus, they achieve a ‘sit at the table’ of 
the international system despite having no material resources. 
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0. Introduction 
 
A small country from the Gulf peninsula, Qatar, disrupted world football statu quo in early 
2010s when was appointed by FIFA as host for 2022 World Cup1, announced a 5-year €165 
million commercial T-shirt agreement with FC Barcelona team 2  and acquired Paris Saint 
Germain football team3. Qatar, the same Arab nation who launched in 1996 Al Jazeera TV 
station -a major media player in the post 9/11 era and in the 2010-11 Arab Uprisings- and the 
same Arab nation who partnered France in 2011 military intervention in Libya. 
From an International Relations (IR)’ systemic point of view, it shouldn’t happen this way. 
Countries are supposed to play the role allowed by their material capabilities. So, a small 
country like Qatar (just 11.586 km2 and 2.3 million inhabitants) couldn’t be a key player in the 
international system. But despite that, Qatar was playing a role. A role that annoyed his Saudi 
neighbours, the regional hegemon, who decided to start a blockade against Qatar in June 2017 
jointly with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain and Egypt. In a nutshell, their main 
demands were: to shut down Al Jazeera and to end his maverick foreign policy. 
This diplomatic crisis had a huge impact in another small country’s public opinion: Singapore. 
Years before Qatar appeared as a player in the global arena, another small country like 
Singapore also shook the official narrative on power. In 70s-80s, this Southeastern Asian island 
surprised the international community by achieving a first-class economical progression. In 
2017, Qatari crisis raised the spectre of a ‘Singaporean crisis’ lead by Malaysia or Indonesia. 
Singapore diplomat Kishore Mahbubani openly assured: “This Qatar episode holds many 
lessons for Singapore” (Mahbubani 2017). 
Singapore, a small successful country viewed as a lighthouse for another small country who 
also wants to punch above his weight as Rwanda. In fact, in 2008 Rwandan president Paul 
                                                 
Kagame requested the director of the Brenthurst Foundation, Greg Mills, to prepare a summary 
of Singapore’s key lessons as a development model to follow4. 
Qatar, Singapore and Rwanda: three small countries, each one with their own material, political 
and cultural characteristics and capabilities, who are trying to surpass their tangible smallness 
throughout a consistent status-seeking strategy. 
By analysing these three subjects, we will try to comprehend which strategies follows a small 
state in order to gain status over its substantially low material resources –or, in Qatar’s case, his 
low material resources compared to his neighbours and regional hegemons.  
In fact, from a materialistic point of view, Norway is also a small state with just 5.2 million 
inhabitants, but it's commonly studied as a middle-power peer to peer with Canada, with some 
kind of normative impact in world politics. Norway's niche diplomacy focused on peace 
building has achieved to project worldwide a strong image of the nation. U.S. President Barack 
Obama assured in December 2009 that “Norway punches above its weight” 5 , a public 
recognition about Norway's role in the world. And the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Knut Vollebæk explained in 2010 that his niche diplomacy focused on peace building “not 
necessarily is an expression of altruism (…). This gave us access also to other fields where I 
could speak about salmon and other things after a while (…). This made us both useful and 
interesting” (Røen, Risvik and De Carvalho, 2010:102). Basically, gaining status as a way to 
gain power: “Social honour, or prestige, may even be the basis of economic power, and very 
frequently has been” (Weber, 1979:927). 
Similarly to Norway's case, there are some studies about status seeking strategies of other small 
developed countries. But there are few focused on those of developing ones. This article tries to 
broke this tendency by focusing on small states outside the European frame. 
‘Power’ is a key concept in IR theory. Joseph S. Nye defined ‘power’ as the ability to influence 
the behaviour of others in order to obtain the outcome you desire (Nye, 2004). By seeking an 
upgraded status category, these three small states are pursuing a certain form of power. Thus, 
by analysing their status strategies we also could try to bring some light to the concept by a 
new way.  
                                                 
   
1. Methodology 
 
In this essay we will try to answer the following research question: “Despite lacking material 
resources, can small states achieve a certain degree of influence in the international system 
applying status-seeking strategies?” 
Through our research we will try to work with and link two contested and/or insufficiently 
developed concepts in the IR discipline as ‘small state’ and ‘status’. We can state that both 
concepts have obtained relatively poor attention from many IR scholars. Therefore, we point 
out we are entering in an undetermined area where not much guides are provided, although we 
hope that this exercise may be useful for future analysis on the subject. By taking this photo we 
will observe if small states are able to achieve power by implementing strategies specifically 
oriented to upgrading their status. 
In order to make operative our research question, we will formulate two working hypotheses. 
Our first hypothesis is that small states from different geographical and cultural regions, and 
with different development levels, can achieve a higher level of status than their material 
capabilities. We will try to prove that strategies to reach a higher status could be similar despite 
these differences. We also formulate the hypothesis that these status-seeking strategies are 
basically based in ‘soft power’ tools, as a difference with great powers that mostly rely in ‘hard 
power’ tools to maintain their status. 
As independent variables we will observe many ‘status markers’ described in paragraphs ahead 
(national wealth progression, acquisition of high-technology weapons, hosting international 
sports events, etc.), while the dependent variable will be international status of small states.  
In the following chapter we will define both ‘small state’ and ‘status’, we will observe if there 
are defined strategies to gain social status in the international system and then we will identify 
which markers we can analyse in order to identify a consistent status-seeking strategy. In the 
third chapter we will analyse to what extent Singapore, Qatar and Rwanda fulfil these markers, 
obtaining a photograph of their similarities and differences regarding status-seeking strategies. 
Finally, we will draw some conclusions.  
 
 
 
  
2. Theoretical framework 
 
2.1. IR theories 
 
The fundamental ordering principle of international politics is anarchy. There is no ‘world 
government’, thus every country looks for its own interests in a system characterised by states’ 
unregulated use of power. Despite this basic definition of world politics, hierarchy is also a key 
concept to understand how international system works. Hierarchy understood as social 
contracts between sovereign states that bind both dominant and subordinate members, 
achieving significant effects on the foreign policies of states as well as patterns of international 
conflict and cooperation (Lake, 2009). Systemic anarchy and hierarchic relations between 
supposed peers are perfectly compatible, as authors like Organski (1958), Keohane (1969), 
Waltz (1993), Buzan & Waever (2000) or Lake (2009) have largely theorised.  
UN is composed by 193 states. Therefore, despite anarchy, despite each one of these countries 
have one vote at the UN General Assembly, it’s also observable they are not in the same 
position in the International system. In fact, 50% of worldwide territory is controlled by just 
eight governments: Russia, Canada, China, U.S., Brazil, Australia, India and Argentina. And, 
on the other hand, six states hold sovereignty over 50% of world population (Barbé 2007: 171): 
China, India, U.S., Indonesia, Brazil and Pakistan. From an economic point of view, the 
intergovernmental political forum of major industrialised countries in the world, G8, was 
formed until 2014 by U.S., Japan, Germany, France, UK, Italy, Canada and Russia6. And top 
10 countries by GDP in 2017 (World Bank 2017) were: U.S., China, Japan, Germany, the 
United Kingdom, France, India, Italy, Brazil and Canada. Finally, nine countries possess 
nuclear weapons: U.S., Russia, UK, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel7 and North Korea. 
By analysing these five classifications we can easily observe that territory, population, political 
and economical power are not necessary correlated. There are 'small countries' in territorial 
terms –Japan has just 377.915 km2, ranking 63 in CIA's World Factbook- that are giants from 
an economic perspective. Even South Korea, the Netherlands or Switzerland are major players 
                                                 
in global economy (12th, 17th and 20th, respectively8) that doesn’t appear in any of these 
classical lists. On the other hand, in these rankings we can find territorial giants but political 
dwarfs like Argentina or Australia. And small states with nuclear armament, like Israel and 
North Korea. Finally, looking at the end of all these charts, we can observe up to 58 unities 
(states and territories) which have populations under one million people. 
From a realist conception of the world -“The strong do what they have the power to do and the 
weak accept what they have to accept” (Thucydides, trans. 1972:401-2)-, just great powers rule 
the world and are the ‘subjects’ of the international system and the rest can simply obey what 
they establish, becoming ‘objects’. From a realist perspective, states have no legal or moral 
restrictions in international affairs and they just pursue their own interest. Thus, this IR school 
considers just great powers deserve academic attention. Even the founding figure of neo-
realism, Kenneth Waltz, considered “ridiculous” to focus on other countries but great powers 
(Waltz, 1979:72). As realism and neo-realism have been the main theories in IR studies, this is 
the reason why very few countries deserved a real academic interest.  
Nevertheless, once the U.S.S.R. collapsed and Cold War finished, ‘hard power’ (military 
coercion, economical sanctions…) becomes increasingly less important in IR analysis. As 
many scholars point out, nuclear weapons -considered as one of the most important hard power 
tools- limit wars between major powers (Waltz, 1993; Buzan & Waever, 2003; Larson, Paul 
and Wohlforth, 2014). Therefore, deterministic theories like Realism and Neo-realism -based 
on material elements and the solely relevance of hard power- loose explanatory capacities in 
front of constructivist ones, based on the ideational dimension of world politics -ideas, norms, 
institutions, interests, human behaviour, money, rights, power relations…- and focusing on the 
agency-structure relation. As power is considered relational, social and perceptual, studies on 
small and middle powers agency become more prominent in the IR academia. In fact, Keohane 
already stated in 1969: "If Lilliputians can tie up Gulliver, or make him do their fighting for 
them, they must be studied as carefully as the giant” (Keohane 1969:310). 
 
 
 
                                                 
2.2. Small state 
 
Despite Keohane’s claim, little progress has been achieved in this area. Even ‘small state’ 
remains a contested concept in the IR literature. And paradoxically we could say that 
Keohane’s literary image entails a great-powerness point of view of the world. As an American 
academic, Keohane presumed every mini-creature who tied the giant was a Lilliputian. But 
assuming this image... how the giant, lying naked on the floor, could know that every small 
creature who tied him was a Lilliputian? Maybe there were pygmies, smurfs, dwarfs, midgets, 
trolls, gnomes, elves, pixies, or even fairies, with different sizes and their own character. 
Similarly, every small state who ties the great power has its own character too, being quite 
difficult to study them as a group. 
In fact, the discipline of IR has not agreed a clear definition of what a ‘small state’ is. Baehr 
concluded in 1975 that ‘small state’ is simply not a useful analytical category, as 'smallness’ 
does not ipso facto explain anything (Baehr:1975:466). Since then, the lack of progress in 
identifying the behavioural characteristics of small states is broadly documented by many 
scholars9. 
Once the academical incapability to define what a small state is has been stated, it is also a 
reality that in the United Nations (UN) exists an informal grouping established precisely by 
Singapore in 1992 entitled ‘Forum of Small States (FOSS)’ in order to lobby for each other, 
discuss issues, exchange ideas and coordinate positions (Chew, 2015:36). Membership in 
FOSS is based not in physical size but by population, considering 10 million inhabitants as the 
barrier. Nowadays, FOSS comprises 107 countries (MFA of Singapore, 2018), from New 
Zealand to Uruguay, as is sustained in a non-ideological and non-geographical base. 
From that point of view, Singapore (5.6 million inhabitants) and Qatar (2.4) are ‘small states’. 
Rwanda surpassed that barrier in 2013 and in 2018 officially has a population of 12 million 
inhabitants10. Many scholars have proposed to identify smallness with the size of the state, but 
this limitation heads us to a proved non-useful category when a minor modification is done. 
To cope with the academical cul-de-sac explained above, we could try to recover a systemic 
role approach to ‘small state’ definition suggested by Keohane himself. He differentiates 
                                                 
between “system-determining states”, “system-influencing states”, “system-affecting states” 
and “system-ineffectual states” (Keohane, 1969:295-6). From that point of view, small states 
are those located into the category “system-ineffectual states”, and their leaders “consider that 
it can never, acting alone or in a small group” could make a significant impact on the system. 
To some extent, this definition matches with the one suggested by Mouritzen and Wivel, 
considering small states as “the weaker part in an asymmetric relationship unable to change the 
nature or functioning of the relationship on their own” (Mouritzen and Wivel, 2005:4). 
Approaching the phenomena by other side, we could accept a ‘small state’ is not a ‘great 
power’. A neo-Realist scholar as Danilovic analyses great powers from three angles: a) power 
potential, both economic and military as well as demographic and territorial; b) their scope of 
interests and their capabilities to sustain the interests that transcend the boundaries of their 
home region; c) their willingness to pursue a great power role (Danilovic 2002:45-46).  
Similarly, Buzan and Waever consider ‘superpowers’ as countries with: a) first-class military-
political capabilities and the economies to support such capabilities; b) they must be capable of 
global military and political reach; c) they need to see themselves as having this rank (Buzan 
and Waever, 2004:34-35). 
Finally, Barbé also define ‘powers’ as those countries who have the military and economic 
resources to fix the rules and to defend these rules (Barbé, 2007:185-190).  
By analysing these three authors, we can abstract the idea that three elements are bound to be 
taken into account at the time of analysing each country: a) distribution of power (resources); 
b) systemic role - role played in the international system (agenda setting, stability/order/change 
of the structure, etc.); c) identity/self-perception (interests: domestic or regional/global). 
Accepting this three-side approach as valid to analyse countries (resources, systemic role and 
self-perception), we can conclude ‘great powers’ rank high in each one of them, and ‘small 
states’ rank low. Between them, ‘middle powers’ have material capabilities, a notable degree of 
foreign policy autonomy and the willingness to play outsized roles in their regions (Gilley and 
O’Neil, 2014:4-7). So, ‘middle powers’ are both “system-influencing states” and “system-
affecting states”, using Keohane’s classification. 
From a neo-realist point of view, we are bound to classify Rwanda as a small state: it’s a 
system-ineffectual nation, has no military power and plays no-role in the international system. 
But it will be unfair saying Rwandan elites’ have no interests beyond domestic ones. Danilovic 
herself accepts constructivist concepts as ‘role’ or ‘willingness’ as a dimension to be 
considered. So, the ‘smallness’ or ‘greateness’ of a small state could be understood as an elite’s 
construction (Thorhallsson and Wivel, 2006:664; Browning, 2006; Gvalia, Siroky et al. 
2013:102; Gibert and Grzelczyk, 2016:3; Kruizinga, 2016:433; Mohammadzadeh, 2017:34) 
and it is basic to analyse this aspect as a keystone to understand foreign policies of one or 
another country. 
That means: ideas matter. Attitudes mater. Small states have agency enough to defy their 
territorial limitations (Chong, 2010). In fact, Rwandan president, Paul Kagame, refuses his 
country to be considered as a ‘small state’. He proclaimed: “They called us a small failed state. 
But we refused to fail. We refused to be small. We are not small. A good idea cannot be small. 
Good ideology cannot be small. People, a nation cannot be small” (Kwibuka, 2016). 
Yet in 1984, the Norwegian diplomat Jan Egeland suggested the concept ‘Potent Small State’ 
to label those small states committed to act as norm entrepreneurs worldwide in the human 
rights area (Egeland, 1984). That means some small states perceive themselves as greater than 
their limited material capabilities and, thus, they try to achieve a greater role in world politics 
throughout playing an active role. That is, trying to influence/affect the system. 
Assuming the suggested definition of ‘small state’ -system-ineffectual country with no material 
resources, no role in the system and with no willing to go beyond domestic affairs-, it’s also 
arguable that in the late sixties, probably small states didn’t have chances to influence the 
world. But in early 21st century, many small states are trying to punch above their weight and 
are “able to have a systemic impact in a small group or through an international institution”, 
using Keohane’s definition to “system-affecting states”. That is, some small states have 
nowadays the capability to reach an upgraded category: throughout their improved status they 
try to surpass their material capabilities and reach the next level of this hierarchy. Even Waltz 
recognised it: “In the nuclear era, countries with smaller economic bases can more easily 
achieve great-power status” (Waltz, 1993:62). 
It’s from this point of view we will analyse Qatar, Singapore and Rwanda: three small states 
whose elites are committed to achieve a greater status than their material capabilities could 
provide them in the anarchic self-help international system. 
  
2.3. Status 
 
Even classic realists like Thomas Hobbes, Niccolò Machiavelli and Thucydides were 
convinced that status matters (Rehnson, 2017:8-9), as countries can achieve or lose power 
depending on how they are perceived by the rest of the international community. A 
neoclassical realist as Gilpin considered “prestige, rather than power, as the everyday currency 
of international relations” (Gilpin, 1981:31).  
It is generally argued that status matters because greater the status you have, greater bolts are 
unlocked to your interests. A core assumption of the literature on status is that nations use their 
status to achieve pursued goals in security and wealth areas (Plourde, 2008; Neumann, De 
Carvalho, 2014:15; Renshon, 2017:3; Biba 2016:456). In fact, former Norwegian foreign 
minister Thorbjørn Jagland recognised in 2001: 
“While we show solidarity and a helping hand to fellow human beings in misery, we 
become a much more central actor in international politics than what our nature-given 
preconditions would have made us, something which makes us an experienced 
contributor and interesting conversation partner, and opens doors which otherwise 
would have been shut” (Matlary, 2002:60). 
Despite status is important in world affairs and IR discipline, nobody knows what status 
concretely is or where it comes from or how to count it (Neumann and De Carvalho, 2014; 
Larson, Paul and Wohlforth, 2014:8-9; Rehnson, 2017:3,8,16,19; Duque, 2018:1). Assuming 
this second academical handicap, following Max Weber we will assume that status depends on 
social recognition: it concerns identification processes in which an actor gains admission into a 
club once they follow the rules of membership and thus obtain privileges (Weber, 1978).  
Hence, ‘status’ is a relational, social and positional term; it depends on other’s points of view 
(Neumann, De Carvalho, 2014:4; Dafoe, Renshon and Huth, 2014: 5-6). And, paraphrasing one 
of the most important authors of the IR Constructivist school, Alexander Wendt, it’s also 
possible to defend that “status is what states (albeit the most powerful states) make of it” 
(Larson, Paul and Wohlforth, 2014:9).  
For small states, we will consider status as the relevance oneself achieves both in front of the 
great power and vis-à-vis a comparison group. In the anarchic self-help international system 
characterised by states’ unregulated use of power, ‘status’ regulates which nation counts and 
which is negligible. Status conceived as an actor’s position in a social hierarchy. And 
understood in a multidimensional sense: an actor can have a high status in a concrete field but a 
low status in another one, or even accumulate a large status but no enforcement capability 
(Lake, 2009; Larson, Paul and Wohlforth, 2014:14).  
We can conclude that status is highly subjective and interrelated. Hence, if everybody accepts 
status is important, in fact it is. Once this assumption has been established, strategies to gain 
status also are important from an IR point of view.  
 
  
2.4. Status-seeking strategies 
 
We will assume as valid the following definition of status-seeking strategies: 
“Status-seeking refers to acts undertaken to maintain or better one’s placement. As this is 
something that is done in competition with others, it is by definition a hierarchized 
activity.” (Neumann, De Carvalho, 2014:5)  
But there’s not a unique competition. Not all states compete with each other. Great powers 
have their own league, due to their own material capabilities (Neumann and De Carvalho, 
2014). And, in fact, these high-status states “serve as a status-conferring authority for lesser 
powers” (Larson, Paul and Wohlforth, 2014:10). In contrast, small states are “motivated by the 
desire to be seen, to share the limelight and to be recognised for their contributions” (Pedersen, 
2017:3). So, we will draw great powers from the equation. 
In fact, small states have their own status-seeking strategies, completely different from those of 
great powers. And these strategies play a core role in their foreign policies, as this is the way to 
obtain a seat at the table (Neumann and De Carvalho, 2014:1; Wohlforth, De Carvalho, Leira 
and Neumann, 2017:3). In fact, the Singapore diplomat Bilahari Kausikan validates this 
remark:  
“Size -physical size- matters and small states are intrinsically irrelevant to the 
workings of the international system (…) for small states, relevance is not something 
to be taken for granted but an artifact: created by human endeavour, and having been 
created, preserved by human endeavour. The creation and maintenance of relevance 
must be the overarching strategic objective of small states” (Kausikan, 2015).  
Along the same line, we could question ourselves if there is just one single status hierarchy, or 
more than one. “Status is manifested in voluntary deference directed toward the higher-status 
actor” (Larson, Paul and Wohlforth, 2014:10). In a multipolar world, not every status seeker 
focus its strategy towards the same higher-status actors: Belarus maybe doesn’t play at the 
same ‘status league’ than Estonia towards the European Union; North Korea doesn’t play at the 
same ‘status league’ towards China than South Korea; Georgia doesn’t play at the same ‘status 
league’ towards NATO than Azerbaijan, etc. Each status seeker try to gain influence in 
different fields and what could be understood as a merit towards one status-conferring actor 
could be seen as a fault towards another. 
Small countries don’t try to challenge great powers, “they will generally aim for a position just 
below them; alongside the hegemon (…) by showing how useful one can be” (Neumann and 
De Carvalho, 2015:16). This essay will assume that Qatar, Rwanda and Singapore, all three 
compete in the almost similar ‘status league’ towards the U.S., considered as the status-
conferring master. Subsequently, U.S. top allies -the U.K., Israel, France, Japan…- are seen as 
susceptible as the U.S. to confer status to these three players. 
As we have previously said, status is positional and relative: you gain status in favour of your 
competitor’s one. But, as a multidimensional and socially constructed hierarchy, “it is a race 
that more than one can win” (Lake, 2014:268). But even being small states, do really Qatar, 
Rwanda and Singapore compete with themselves? There really exists a ‘small states status 
league’? Rehnson has a precise answer: "Even internationally, status is local” (Rehnson 
2017:22). As Nordic countries compete with each other, Qatar competes against Gulf 
neighbours; Rwanda, against the Sub-Saharan African countries, and Singapore against the 
South-East Asian nations. In each of these territorial contexts, each state tries to gain U.S. 
recognition as the international system hegemon and status assigner. And Qatar, Rwanda and 
Singapore are trying to achieve better marks than their bigger neighbours.  
 
2.5. Status markers 
 
Singaporean diplomat Kausikan explained there is no “magic formula” to gain status, but 
underlined what he considers the pillar: a successful economy (Kausikan, 2015). Assuming the 
basic limitation that neither the Academia nor politicians precisely understand or agree where 
status comes from, we also assume that there are actions considered to be seen as status-
gaining ones. This way, many scholars had argued that decisions like the purchase of military 
equipment by non-great powers or being involved in military operations worldwide cannot 
plausibly be explained with reference to strategic necessity and are better understood in the 
framework of bandwagoning for status (Pedersen, 2017; Massie, 2011; Carvalho Pinto, 2017). 
And, even, the desire for enhanced status may lead emerging powers to spend money on highly 
visible measures of status -such as space programs- rather than using their wealth to enforce 
domestic policies (Larson, Paul and Wohlforth, 2014:27). 
Larson, Paul and Wohlforth argue that there are some ‘status markers’ we can observe in order 
to infer that a country is seeking to improve its status. This markers include: membership in 
elite clubs such as the Group of 8 (G8), permanent membership in the UNSC, leadership 
positions in international organisations, hosting international sports events, formal state visits, 
summit meetings, inclusion in informal problem-solving groups, space programs, acquisition of 
high-technology weapons, major diplomatic initiatives, promotion of a state’s soft power or 
culture, and efforts to surpass others’ economic growth rates (Larson, Paul and Wohlforth, 
2014:10-12). 
This list matches with many partial considerations of other scholars: “The role played by the 
small state has to be noticed by the great power, and the recognition needs to be public” 
(Pedersen, 2017:5); as status is social, “events that change perceptions of status must be visible 
to all potential observers” (Rehnson, 2017:24); “being a major donor to the UN for instance 
gives competitive status among certain peer groups of small states, but also gives 
acknowledgement from great powers for system maintenance” (Wohlforth, De Carvalho, Leira 
and Neumann 2017:7). Other scholars also suggest that actions to change status may involve 
military assertiveness, joining international organisations or hosting the Olympic games 
(Larson and Shevchenko, 2003; 2010; Pu and Schweller, 2014).  
We will assume all these ‘status markers’ as a guiding tool to unveil Qatar, Rwanda and 
Singapore’s strategies to gain a presence in the global forum. Often an overwhelming presence 
in contrast to their smallness. 
According to these multiple references, in this essay we will observe the following ‘status 
markers’, conveniently adapted to small states’ characteristics -as no one of them have real 
options to hold a permanent seat in the UNSC or be part of the G8: 
 
 
 
  
Politics and Economy 
a) Political project 
b) National wealth progression 
c) Major diplomatic initiatives 
d) Formal state visits and summit meetings 
e) Membership in the UNSC and leadership positions in international organisations 
 
Security 
f) Acquisition of high-technology weapons 
g) Peacekeeping operations 
h) Military alliances 
 
Science, Sports & Culture 
i) Space programs 
j) Hosting/sponsoring international sports events 
k) Promotion of a state’s soft power or culture 
 
Identified these markers here and now, it is also smart to recognise that “there is no objective, 
time-invariant formula for what qualities or attributes confer status” (Renshon, 2017:4). But, 
accepting this limitation, we tend to think that a small state involved in all those initiatives will 
be a state trying to play a role in the world scenario. 
 
 
 
  
3. Comparison 
 
3.0. General overview 
 
Qatar is a small barren peninsula on the Northeastern coast of the Arabian Peninsula with just 
11.581 km2 and 2.,3 million inhabitants, bordering Saudi Arabia (2.149.690 km2 and 28.5m 
inhabitants) and the Persian Gulf. Other key regional neighbours are: Iran (1.648.195 km2 and 
82m people), United Arab Emirates (83.600 km2 and 6m people). Despite the small territory, 
Qatar sits on top of the world's largest single gas field, North Dome, frontier and shared with 
Iran –called South Pars at the Iranian side. In fact, Qatar owns the world's third-largest reserves 
of natural gas (24,3 million m3), behind Russia (47.8) and Iran (33.5)11. Therefore is one of the 
largest export economy in the world and is the richest country per capita, with $128.700 GDP 
per capita (International Monetary Fund, 2017). 
Singapore is an island in Southeast Asia with just 719 km2 and 5,8m population. Neighbours 
with similar status ambitions are Malaysia (329.847 km2 and 31m inhabitants) and Indonesia 
(1.904.569 km2 and 260m inhabitants -the world's 4th most populous country). Singapore has 
no natural resources thus his economy depends heavily on trade: from poor country in the 
1960s, Singapore is nowadays a high-income economy with a gross national income of 
$52.600 per capita, provides one of the world’s most business-friendly regulatory environment 
and is ranked by the World Bank among the world’s most competitive economies12.  
Rwanda is a landlocked country from Central and East Africa with just 26.338 km2 and 11,2 
million inhabitants and with no relevant enough natural resources. Regional status competitors 
are: Kenya (580.367 km2 and 47m people), Uganda (241.038 km2 and 39.5m people) and 
Tanzania (947.300 km2 and 53.9m people). Compared to Qatar and Singapore, Rwanda is an 
economic dwarf. In fact, his tiny export economy is just the 155th in the world, exporting 
                                                 
$869M and importing $2.05B in 201613. Besides, is a net Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) recipient, receiving $1.148,4M in 201614. 
3.1. Politics and Economy 
a) Political project 
As policies are conceived and implemented by politicians, we will identify as ‘status marker’ 
the elite’s role, their institutional cohesion and their persistence in power (a1) and if they have 
promoted any kind of political roadmap towards achieving a greater role (a2), from being a 
“system-ineffectual state” to a “system-affecting state”. 
Assuming the individual-level variables are interesting in conducting small states’ policies, we 
can observe Singapore, Qatar an Rwanda’s ruling elites share some particularities to be 
considered: 1) all three initial leaders studied in the West: Lee Kwan Yew studied at 
Fitzwilliam College, University of Cambridge, from 1947 to 1949; Hamad bin Khalifa Al 
Thani was a graduate of Sandhurst, the British Royal Military Academy and Paul Kagame was 
sent in 1990 by the Ugandan army for training at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff 
College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and 2) they hold a clear and prolonged hegemony 
(People’s Action Party rules Singapore since independence; Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani and 
his son, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, since the 1995 bloodless palace coup against Khalifa bin 
Hamad Al Thani; Paul Kagame since 1994) thus they can implement middle and long-term 
policies. 
Said that, each nation has developed its own political project by his way. But each of them 
have published a political roadmap where they show where they want to be in the years ahead: 
Rwanda launched in 2000 the “Rwanda Vision 2020” and in April 2004 the “Rwanda National 
Meetings, Incentives, Conferences/Conventions and Events/Exhibitions (MICE) Tourism 
Strategy”; Qatar approved in 2003 a new Constitution, launched in July 2008 the “Qatar 
National Vision 2030” and in March 2011 the “Qatar National Development Strategy 2011-
2016”, and Singapore in November 2014 kicked-off the initiative “Smart Nation”. Despite not 
                                                 
having a written political roadmap, first Singaporean prime minister Lee Kuan Yew have 
always displayed a strong commitment towards achieving a greater role in the system.  
Lee’s aim and Rwanda’s and Qatar’s roadmaps share some similarities: they conceive an 
efficient and effective administration and first-class infrastructures as the key pillars were to 
build the rest of the project, and they understand their own markets are too small thus they see 
the rest of the world as their natural environment -both by transforming their own labour force 
from rural to a high-skilled one, and by opening their markets to foreign investments. By 
achieving these goals, they three also understand they are ensuring their own sovereignty. 
This political commitment -showed in official papers, speeches or even in the approval of a 
new Qatari Constitution- is a sign to promote a liberal and Western-minded image of 
themselves and can be understood as a way to gain status towards the U.S. 
 
b) National wealth progression 
 
Both Qatar and Singapore are small countries with an extremely wealthy economy, while 
Rwanda is one of the poorest nations in the world. Thus, Rwanda’s economy cannot be 
compared with Qatari or Singaporean ones -despite sixty years ago, probably three economies 
were equally poor. Therefore, as markers we will use how fastest GDP growth is progressing 
(b1) and how rating agencies qualify each economy compared with neighbours (b2) -thus, 
which ‘status’ deserve each economy.  
Three analysed countries have had a “momentum” in world economy: Singapore in the 60s-
70s, Qatar in the 2000s and Rwanda nowadays. GDP growth in Singapore was amongst the 
world’s highest, at an average of 7.7% since independence and topping 9.2% in the first 25 
years15; Qatar also ranked first from 2000 to 2010, achieving a GDP growth averaged 15.9% a 
year, outstripping even that of China (Ibrahim and Harrigan, 2012), and Rwanda is the 2018 
                                                 
fifth fastest growing economy in the world16, considering that in 2017 his economy grew by 
6.1%, beating 5.2% projections set earlier17. 
Having natural resources or not, three small states have boosted their economies in order to 
matter in world politics. Singaporean diplomat Bilahari Kausikan recognised: “Success must be 
defined first of all in economic terms. Will a barren rock ever be taken seriously?” (Kausikan, 
2015). In fact, Singapore it is commonly shown as a case study in rapid development 
(International Monetary Fund, 1995). 
Accepting status is regional, all three small states have better sovereign ratings than their 
neighbours. In fact, Singapore is the only country in Asia with an AAA sovereign rating from 
all major rating agencies, and even one of only a few countries worldwide. Despite Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) boycott, Qatar’s ratings are even better than most of their 
neighbours: in August 2018, Moody’s Qatar’s rate was ‘Aa3’, while Saudi Arabia’s rate was 
‘A1’; Bahrain had a ‘B2’ and Egypt, a ‘B3’. Just UAE’s rating was one step better: ‘Aa2’. As 
Moody’s doesn’t rate most African countries, we will use Fitch as marker. According to that, 
Rwanda’s rating is considered as one of the powerful ones in the region: ‘B+ (Stable)’ since 
January 2016. Uganda’s economy also holds the same label, and Kenya had a ‘B+ (Negative)’ 
rating from July 2015 to February 2018, then upgraded to the same ‘B+ (Stable)’ category. 
South Africa, the regional hegemon, is qualified with just in the ‘BB+ (Stable)’ category. Other 
neighbours, as the Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) or Burundi, even aren’t rated.  
It’s also remarkable World Bank considers Singapore as the economy with the most business-
friendly regulation, while Rwanda is the second easiest country to do business in Africa (The 
World Bank, 2016). Both have also shown its interest to become tech hubs in their own 
regions, as material capabilities are not a condition to cloud economy. 
 
c) Major diplomatic initiatives 
 
                                                 
We will analyse if these supposed “system-ineffectual states” play a diplomatic role in their 
region or far away, by implementing initiatives in political or economical areas (c1). 
These three countries have excelled in promoting diplomatic initiatives as a way to appear as a 
player in international arena. It is also argued it is a way to maintain regional peace and, 
therefore, to maintain its own economy and even sovereignty, throughout defending the 
preeminence of the rule of law (Koh, 2018).  
Briefly summarised, Singapore was one of the six founding nations of ASEAN and the APEC 
Secretariat is established in Singapore since 1993; Singapore also hosted in April 1993 the 
“Wang-Koo summit”18 and in November 2015 the the “Xi-Ma meeting”19 in order to promote 
dialogue between the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China. In fact, this 
expertise in critical meetings head Singapore towards a major historical meeting in June 12, 
2018, such was the first U.S.-North Korea presidential summit since the political partition of 
the Korean peninsula in 1945. Singapore recognised they didn’t put their hand up, but they 
were asked20, as Singapore maintained diplomatic relations with both U.S. and North Korea21. 
Beyond Asia, Singapore also created the UN’s Forum of Small States (FOSS) in 1992; 
proposed the creation of the East Asia-Latin America Forum (EALAF) in 1998; created the 
Global Governance Group (3G) in 2009, and was accepted as Observer in the Arctic Council in 
2013. It’s also highly remarkable Singapore has often been invited to participate in G20 events 
since 201022, despite not being a major economy. 
As a powerful economical player, Qatar achieved a major hit in 2001, when the Fourth 
Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO) was held in Doha, starting the 
so called “Doha Development Round”. Qatar also tried to become a regional powerhouse in 
regional mediation since 2005, being involved in several conflicts and maintaining pretty good 
diplomatic relations with declared antagonists in the region (Barakat, 2012). But this strategy 
was not well-received by its neighbours: during the 2010-11 Arab Uprising, Qatar was accused 
                                                 
of seeking a destabilisation in the region and in June 2017 started a Saudi-led blockade against 
the emirate endorsed also by the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt. One year after this diplomatic crisis 
begun, analysts say Qatar is winning23,24,25. Qatar, a hydrocarbon exporter, also hosted the UN 
Climate Change Conference COP18 in 2012. 
Finally, Rwanda also tries to promote a regional economic consensus as Singapore did in the 
60s: on March 21, 2018 was signed in Kigali the African Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA 
or AfCFTA) in order to create a single continental market for goods and services, to enhance 
competitiveness and to expand intra African trade. 
 
d) Formal state visits and summit meetings 
 
In diplomacy, being received at The White House is the top achievement a leader could 
receive. Thus, we will use these visits as markers to identify a status-seeking strategy, also 
considering positive comments the current U.S. president, Donald Trump, could have 
pronounced (d1). But as politics is not the only status-conferring sphere, we will also observe 
official visits to the Vatican or from the Pope to the country -understood as ‘moral’ status-
conferring sphere (d2). Also, in the economic arena, we will take Microsoft founder Bill Gates 
as marker (d3), as he was the world’s wealthiest person for 23 years in a row until 2017, 
according to Forbes26. 
All three countries got special attention from the White House. Singapore visited the U.S. 
presidency building four times (1973, 1975, 1985 and 2016) while Rwanda and Qatar achieved 
access to Washington twice (2006 and 2014, and 2015 and 2018, respectively). These countries 
also have been honoured with official visits from one or another sitting U.S. president: 
Singapore in 1992, 2003, 2006, 2009 and 2018; Rwanda in 1998 and 2008, and Qatar in 2003. 
                                                 
In Qatar’s diplomatic crisis, it is interesting to note Trump initially aligned with Saudi 
positions -considering the emirate “a funder of terrorism at a very high level” (The White 
House, 2017). Then, the White House abruptly shifted this position and in April 2018 emir 
Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani was warmly welcomed by the entire Trump administration. The 
American president then praised Qatari emir as “a friend of mine” and “a great gentleman”. In 
fact, during his term Trump also qualified Singapore and Rwanda’s leaders as “friends” (The 
White House, 2018c; The White House, 2018a). 
In another ‘status league’, related to spiritual beliefs, being received at the Vatican or to host an 
official pastoral visit can also be considered as a major achievement. Pope John Paul II made 
an official visit to Singapore in 198627; Qatari Sheikha Moza bint Nasser was received by Pope 
Francis in June 4, 201628, and Kagame was received by Pope Francis in March 20, 201729.  
These three Vatican recognitions are ought to be considered as major Qatari, Singaporean and 
Rwandan diplomatic achievements: despite Qatar and Singapore are not Christian countries, 
they deserved Pope’s attention. In Rwanda’s case, Kagame’s government officially considers 
Catholic institutions and missions “played a decisive role” in the 1994 genocide (Government 
of the Republic of Rwanda, 2017) and Pope Francis expressed a “humble recognition of the 
failings of that period”30.  
Attracting the interest of leading economical figures it’s also a strategy to gain status. 
Assuming Bill Gates as a marker, Singapore, Qatar and Rwanda also merited his attention one 
year or another: in April 13, 2016, Gates visited Doha to receive $50 million from the Qatar 
Development Fund31; Singapore as a technological hub is a common destination in Gates’ 
                                                 
trips32, and Rwanda is often cited by Gates as a “success story” in implementing health-care 
protocols33. 
Said this, it is interesting to note two major Rwandan diplomatic hits occurred in 2018: in 20 
April Commonwealth Heads of Government accepted Kagame’s offer to host their next 
meeting in 202034, and in July Kagame hosted two state visits from Chinese President Xi 
Jinping35 and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi36. 
e) Membership in the UNSC and leadership positions in international 
organisations 
 
We will observe if these small countries have accessed to the UN Security Council (UNSC) in 
a two-year term as a status maker (e1), assuming that there are 65 out of 193 nations which 
have never been elected as members of the Security Council since 194637. Also we will view if 
any national leads any regional or international organisation, or the country host any 
headquarter (e2).  
The three small states have been members of the UNSC38. Rwanda, in fact, held this honour 
twice: 1994-95 and in 2013-14; Singapore in 2001-02, and Qatar in 2006-07. Thus, the three 
small states are taken as peers by the international community.  
Both Singapore and Rwanda lead regional organisations. Singapore was one of the five 
founding nations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967 and also 
                                                 
hosts the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Secretariat since 5 February 1993. 
Singapore also hosts since 2002 the “IISS Asia Security Summit: The Shangri-La Dialogue”. 
Rwanda’s president Paul Kagame was elected in 28 January 2018 as president of the African 
Union (AU) for the year 201839. Rwanda is also bidding to lead the Organisation Internationale 
de la Francophonie (OIF) and has received support from the French president, Emmanuel 
Macron, in May 201840. If Rwanda achieves this honour, when Commonwealth Heads of 
Government will met in Kigali in 2020 it will be the country were English-spoken world and 
French-spoken world will met together. 
As said, Qatar has no this regional projection, probably because it is located in what is called 
“one of the world’s toughest neighbourhoods” (Kamrava, 2013:48). Qatar try to overcome this 
limitation by being the largest donor from the MENA region to the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR)41 and to Palestinian refugees42.  
 
 
3.2. Security 
 
f) Acquisition of high-technology weapons 
 
As said43, from an IR point of view acquisition of military material could be understood in the 
framework of bandwagoning for status. In fact, during Al Thani’s 2018 visit to the White 
House, Trump precisely praised the emir as a great purchaser of military equipment (The White 
House, 2018b). Thus, we will see if analysed countries practice this kind of purchases (f). 
                                                 
Both Qatar and Singapore import huge quantities of weaponry, being 20th and 21st largest 
importers of major arms from 2013 to 201744. Both countries have the U.S. as major supplier: 
67% and 70%, respectively. In this aspect, as national wealth is key, Rwanda fulfils no relevant 
marks. 
It is interesting to note the U.S. and Qatar maintain a strong military relationship, as Al Udeid 
Qatari air base is the largest American military airbase in the Middle East. But Qatar also relies 
on France to acquire weaponry and in December 29, 2011, Qatar Holding became top investor 
of the French media and defence group Lagardère45. Lagardère holds a 7.5% stake of the 
aerospace group EADS -rebranded in 2014 as Airbus Group. On the same track, it’s also 
remarkable that Singapore is not just an arms-importer small state, as it is also an arms-
producer country: the “government-linked”46 ST Engineering company is ranked as the 53th 
major arms exporter47.  
In the sub-Saharan Africa context, Russia is the largest supplier. Thus, Rwanda have in 
Moscou its main supplier (67,21%) and doesn’t buy U.S. defence equipment. But it’s 
interesting to note Rwanda’s second major arms supplier is Israel (21,31%), a close U.S. ally. 
 
g) Peacekeeping operations 
 
Accepting nor Qatar, nor Singapore, neither Rwanda face external military threats willing to 
undermine their sovereignty, their military implication in multilateral operations fits as a status 
seeking strategy. We will observe how much they contribute to UN peacekeeping operations 
(g). 
Singapore and Rwanda are totally committed with UN peacekeeping operations, while Qatar 
don’t use this ‘UN peacekeeping strategy’ and seeks military status by other ways. 
                                                 
Singapore collaborate with UN missions since 197048 and Rwanda is the 3rd. largest troop and 
police contributor to the UN peacekeeping forces 49 , 50 . Russian Foreign Minister Sergey 
Lavrov51 and Chinese Major General Zhang Yingli52 have publicly recognised Rwanda for this 
implication. 
Qatar tried to rank high militarily by being involved in 2011 intervention in Libya led by 
France53 and was also a member of the U.S.-led coalition combating the Islamic State in Syria 
(Katzman, 2018). 
 
h) Military alliances 
 
Small states try to rely on defence alliances with major powers. Thus, we will see if they have 
formal alliances or they have expressed their willingness to be part of an alliance (h). 
Just Singapore is part of a defensive multi-lateral agreement, while Qatar has expressed his 
desire to be part of NATO. Rwanda doesn’t fulfil this marker. 
As a former British colony, Singapore enjoys good relations with the U.K. which shares ties in 
the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) along with Malaysia, Australia and New 
Zealand. And the U.S. Navy uses constantly Singaporean naval facilities to support its 
operations in Southeast Asia. 
                                                 
Neither Qatar nor Rwanda join any military alliance. But the Qatari Deputy Prime Minister and 
Minister of State For Defense Affairs, Khalid Bin Mohammed Al-Attiyah, officially 
proclaimed in June 2018 Qatar wants to be a NATO member: “We are a major ally outside 
NATO. Our aspiration for full membership is there, should our partnership with NATO 
develop further” (Altalaya 2018). 
 
 
  
3.3. Science, Sports and Culture 
 
i) Space programs 
 
Accepting the so called ‘space race’ between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R was also a status race, 
and accepting a small state cannot put a man on the moon, we will observe if analysed 
countries maintain any king of space-related program as a status marker (i). 
But both Qatar and Singapore maintain niche programs in this area. Here, as funds are crucial, 
Rwanda doesn’t maintain any space program -as any other of his East African neighbours does. 
Qatar launched the Qatar Exoplanet Survey in 2010 jointly with the Harvard-Smithsonian 
Center for Astrophysics, clearly linking space research and improvement of Qatari status54. 
Singapore also have a space program, the Centre for Remote Imaging, Sensing and Processing 
(CRISP), launched in 1995. In 2017, there were over 30 space-related companies in Singapore 
and more than 1.000 professionals, including over 150 researchers55. 
 
j) Hosting/sponsoring international sports events 
 
Hosting an international sports event is a sign of status, as sports are largest TV audience 
attracting programmes. Also, to sponsor a major sports club it’s a way to achieve notable 
impact in mass media (j). 
Three analysed countries rank high in this area, being Qatar the country which shines most. 
Qatar demonstrates a strong interest in hosting major tournaments in its territory. This strategy 
started in 2004, when first Qatar motorcycle Grand Prix (motoGP) was organised. In 2006, 
Qatar organised the Asian Games, and in December 2, 2010, FIFA appointed Qatar as host for 
2022 World Cup. Just some days afterwards, in December 10, FC Barcelona announced a 5-
                                                 
year €165 million commercial T-shirt agreement with Qatar Foundation, in January 2011 Asian 
Cup was played in Qatar and in June 30, 2011, Qatar Sports Investments bought 70% of Paris 
Saint Germain football club. In just six months, from December 2010 to June 2011, Qatar 
emerged as a crucial player in world football status quo. 
Since then, Qatar’s implication in world sports has grown, due to the annual ATP Qatar 
ExxonMobil Open (tennis), the Qatar Masters (golf), the 2014 FINA World Swimming 
Championships, the 2015 IHF world men’s handball championships, the sports academy 
Aspire, etc. In December 2019, Doha also will host the IAAF World Championships. 
The 2011 Qatar National Development Strategy 2011-2016 underline sports are a method to 
enhance the nation’s regional and international image (Qatar General Secretariat for 
Development Planning, 2011:196) and an executive of the Qatari-owned PSG, Frédéric 
Longuépée, assured in 2017 that the club was part of the global strategy of Qatar to promote 
and protect the country (Chanavat 2017:4). 
Singapore, far away from Qatar intensive strategy, also hosts a worldwide sports events as the 
Singapore Formula 1 Grand Prix is: the competition is composed by 21 races, and this Asian 
Southeast small state organises one of it. In fact, Qatar wanted to host a F1 race too, but 
Bahrain doesn’t allows it. Bahrain first hosted an F1 race in 2004 and the CEO of the Formula 
One Group, Bernie Ecclestone, explained in 2014 Bahrain has the power to veto Qatar F1 race, 
as they have an agreement they have to approve other races in the Middle East56. In fact, since 
2009 Bahrain allows the UAE to host a F1 race, but not Qatar. 
Rwanda, described continuously as a poor small country, doesn’t seem to have the capacity to 
play this league. But they do. On May 22 2018 it was announced a £30million-a-year 
sponsorship deal until 2020/21 season between Visit Rwanda and English Arsenal Football 
Club57. Visit Rwanda argued the country will achieve a deep impact “helping its drive to be an 
even more successful tourism and investment destination” 58 . The CEO of the Rwanda 
Development Board, Clare Akamanzi, explained the deal as a proactive marketing strategy to 
take Rwanda out of poverty by attracting tourism59,60 By reading those arguments, it is hardly 
                                                 
 
difficult not to compare Qatar 2010 decision to sponsor FC Barcelona T-shirt and the Rwanda-
Arsenal agreement. 
 
k) Promotion of a state’s soft power or culture 
 
Assuming ‘soft power’ is the willing to influence other states by cultural ways, we will see if 
Qatar, Singapore and Rwanda have the will to generate this influence (k).  
As three analysed countries are from three different cultural spheres, there is not a common 
area where they are pushing hard. Assuming that limitation, analysed countries show a strong 
will to promote their culture far away: Qatar by implementing Al Jazeera TV network; 
Singapore by being a ‘moral referent’ in the Southeast Asia, and Rwanda being a lighthouse in 
healthcare in the African context. 
Qatar has showed a strong will in playing a role outside his own borders61. In November 1, 
1996, new emir, Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, launched Al Jazeera TV station and since then 
has disrupted regional statu quo in order to gain status in Western countries (Bahry, 2001). In 
fact, Saudi Arabia also broke diplomatic relations with Qatar over Al Jazeera coverage of the 
kingdom from 2002 to 2007. U.S. leaders also worried Al Jazeera’s influence: secretary of state 
Hillary Clinton claimed in 2011 that the U.S. was losing the global information war and Al 
Jazeera was “winning” (Democracy Now!, 2011). But this strategy colluded in 2010-11 with 
those of being a regional mediator powerhouse, when the TV station was accused of a pro-
Muslim Brotherhood bias in Arab uprisings. Therefore, Qatar’s reputation as a neutral 
peacemaker across regional elite’s was seriously damaged (Barakat, 2012). Also Al Jazeera’s 
reputation as an independent media is under threat (Samuel-Azran & Pecht, 2014:218; The 
Economist, 2017).  
                                                                                                                                                          
Singapore also tried to play a crucial political role in his area62, and in fact Lee Kuan Yew 
played a moral position recognised both by Asian and Western leaders. Still nowadays the city-
state is a model of good governance and a great example of multiculturalism. And, as said, 
Singapore has been a model for Rwanda and even is recognised in the central “Rwanda Vision 
2020” (Republic of Rwanda, 2000: 27). His task in world economy63, as the most open and 
globalised country in the world, has also been a milestone in his own promotion. Nowadays, 
this opening to economy propels Singapore to digital innovation and cloud-based 
technologies64. 
Singapore likewise decided to promote itself as a knowledge-based economy and become the 
‘knowledge hub’ of Asia. Nowadays, Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University (NTU) 
and National University of Singapore (NUS) rank Asias 1st. and 2nd. in QS World University 
Rankings65. Singapore is also home to a selection of leading universities around the world, like 
the Singapore-MIT Alliance for Research and Technology, MIT's only research centre outside 
the U.S. 
Rwanda’s soft power promotion is shining is in healthcare, as the country operates a universal 
health care system and is considered to have one of the highest-quality health systems in Africa 
(Nyandekwe, Nzayirambaho and Kakoma, 2014). Articles in the U.S. press even points out 
Rwanda as an example for national healthcare system66. An academic comparison of health 
achievements both in Rwanda and Burundi concludes there exist a significant increase in life 
expectancy in Rwanda relative to Burundi (Iyer et al, 2018). 
Rwanda also ranks at the top of gender issues, as its parliament is that with more women 
parliamentarians in the world (61,3%67) and the government ranks at the 7h position in women 
in ministerial position’s ranking68. 
                                                 
   
3.4. Markers comparison 
 
Once analysed the information provided, we will try to systematise it in a table so that we can 
have a general view of the three case studies. We will assign a value of 1 or a 0 to each marker, 
depending if its fulfilled or not. Therefore, we will limit to mark each marker as ‘completed’ or 
‘uncompleted’.  
As seen in the following table, Singapore fulfils each marker, while Qatar and Rwanda fail to 
do it in some markers. Singapore faces no regional troubles thus can seek status both regionally 
and globally, whereas Qatar is facing an unprecedented regional blockade, limiting its 
capabilities to rank positively in the regional level. Rwanda achieves good marks at the sub-
Saharan level despite lacking enough wealth to rank globally. But if this study would be 
adapted specifically to a local reality -assuming neither any country joins the space race nor is 
buying high-technology weapons-, Rwanda would rank at the top of the table. 
 
 Politics and Economy Security SSC   
 a1 a2 b1 b2 c d1 d2 d3 e1 e2 f g h i j k  TOTAL 
Singapore 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  16 
Qatar 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1  14 
Rwanda 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1  13 
 
 
Caption: 
 
a1) Elite’s role 
a2) Political roadmap 
b1) GDP growth progression 
b2) Rating comparison 
c) Major diplomatic initiatives 
d1) Political attention (White House) 
d2) Spiritual attention (Vatican) 
d3) Economical attention (Bill Gates) 
e1) UNSC membership 
e2) Leading international organisations 
f) Acquisition of high-technology weapons 
g) Peacekeeping operations 
h) Military alliances 
i) Involvement in space programs 
j) Hosting/sponsoring international sports events 
k) Promotion of a state’s soft power or culture 
 
   
4. Conclusion 
 
Once these 16 status-seeking markers have been analysed, it is hardly not to say Singapore, 
Qatar and Rwanda are performing pretty well their own strategies to achieve a major status and 
play a major role than their physical limitations initially kept to them. They are not just 
“system-ineffectual states”, they also are “system-affecting states”. Thus, they could be 
labelled as ‘small powers’ or ‘potent small states’. One way or another, these small states are 
sitting at tables not a priori conceived to them: Singapore at the G20 summits and East Asia-
Latin America Forum; Qatar at FIFA and the World Trade Organisation; Rwanda at the 
African Union and the Commonwealth, etc. Small states have agency enough to overtake its 
limitations and become key players in world arena.  
Therefore, despite lacking material resources, small states from different geographical and 
cultural regions, and with different development levels, can achieve a certain degree of 
influence in the international system applying status-seeking strategies. And regardless of 
material, regional and developmental differences, those strategies appear to be quite similar. 
Our second hypothesis is also validated, as these status-seeking strategies are basically based in 
‘soft power’ tools. 
It’s also defensible these movements could entail a pro-sovereignty point of view: by 
maintaining regional peace and the preeminence of the rule of law, small states can guarantee 
their own existence. Also, by gaining status and being known in Western societies, it is thought 
Western governments are not likely to allow regional hegemons to bully these small states. 
Therefore, there’s too a survival goal in these strategies. 
As seen in analysed cases, elite’s commitment to achieve a greater role is the linchpin were the 
entire project can be constructed. Thus, individual-level variables play a crucial role in 
explaining the foreign policy behaviour of small states. This particularity heads us towards a 
question: when another elite group will achieve power in those countries, they will maintain 
these status-seeking strategies? To date, this scenario has not happened in studied countries. In 
Georgia, an abrupt change in ruling elites was immediately followed by a bandwagoning 
strategy towards Russia (Gvalia et al, 2013) 
It is also remarkable their shared maverick foreign relations: despite pretending to be seen as 
strong U.S. allies, they maintain diplomatic relations with several U.S. rivals (Singapore with 
North Korea and China; Qatar with Iran, the Talibans and Hamas; Rwanda with China and 
Russia) and also maintain relations with regional enemies (Singapore with China and Taiwan; 
Qatar with Iran and Israel). As “system-ineffectual states”, they can pleasure maintaining these 
relations. Great powers know this could be an escape route in any possible crisis. In fact, it’s 
said small states can achieve status by being useful to system-determining states (Neumann and 
De Carvalho, 2015:16). This could be a way. 
Finally, it’s commonly recognised Singapore and Qatar are “system-affecting states”, not just 
small states, and it’s quite interesting to oversee how Rwanda is following the same track and 
is achieving great marks in the African context. Hence, it’s consistent to say other small states -
enjoying natural resources or not- who wants to become “system-affecting states” could learn 
from these experiences.  
5. Bibliography 
 
• Altalaya (2018, June 5) “H.E. The Deputy Prime Minister And Minister Of State For Defense 
Affairs: Qatar Continues Its Development Plans With The Wisdom And Guidance Of HH The 
Emir”. Retrieved from https://altalaya.qa/en/سعادة-وزير-الرولة-لرؤول-اادولة-وطر-اا/ 
• Archer, C.; Nugent, N. (2002) “Introduction: small states and the European Union”, in Archer, C.; 
Nugent, N. (eds) Special Edition of Current Politics and Economics of Europe: Small States and 
the European Union, vol. 11 (1), 1-10  
• Baehr, P. (1975) “Small States: A Tool for Analysis?”, World Politics, 27 (3), 456-466 
• Bahry, L. (2001) “The new Arab media phenomenon: Qatar’s Al Jazeera”, Middle East Policy, vol. 8 
(2), 88-99 
• Bailes, J.K. (2013) “Scotland as an Independent Small State: Where would it seek shelter?”, 
Icelandic Review of Politics and Administration, vol. 9 (1), 1-20 
• Barakat, S. (2012) The Qatari Spring: Qatar’s emerging role in peacemaking. Research Paper, 
Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalisation in the Gulf States. York: 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
• Barbé, E. (2007) Relaciones Internacionales. Third edition. Madrid: Tecnos 
• Barr, M. (2000) “Lee Kuan Yew and the ‘Asian Values’ debate”. Asian Studies Review. Vol. 24 (3), 
309-334 
• Biba, S. (2016) “It’s status, stupid: explaining the underlying core problem in US–China relations”, 
Global Affairs, 2:5, 455-464 
• Blanchard, C. (2014): “Qatar: Background and US Relations”, Congressional Research Services 
• Browning, C. (2006) “Small, Smart and Salient? Rethinking Identity in the Small States Literature”, 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, vol. 19 (4), 669-684 
• Buzan, B.; Waever, O. (2003) Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security. New 
York: Cambridge University Press 
• Carvalho Pinto, V. (2017) “Em busca de status: A participação dos Emirados Árabes na missão 
ISAF- Afeganistão da OTAN”. In De Melo Araújo, A.; Alfaix Assis, A.; Da Mata, S. (org.) Entre 
filosofia, história e relações internacionais. Escritos em homenagem a Estevão de Rezende 
Martins, 299-311. São Paulo: LiberArs/SBTHH 
• Chanavat, N. (2017) “French football, foreign investors: global sports as country branding”, Journal 
of Business Strategy, vol. 38 (6), 3-10 
• Chew, T.S. (2015) “A History of the Forum of Small States”, in Koh, T.; Chang, L.; Koh, J. (Eds.) 
50 Years of Singapore and the United Nations, 35-38. Singapore:World Scientific Publishing Co 
• Chin, J. (2015) “Lee Kuan Yew and Malaysia”, The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of 
International Affairs, 1-2 
• Chong, A. (2010) “Small state soft power strategies: virtual enlargement in the cases of the Vatican 
City State and Singapore”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 23(3), 383-405 
• Crisafulli, P.; Redmond, A. (2012) Rwanda, Inc: How a Devastated Nation Became an Economic 
Model for the Developing World, New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan 
• Dafoe, A.; Renshon, J.; Huth, P. (2014) “Reputation and Status as Motives for War”, Annual Review 
of Political Science, vol. 17, 371-393 
• Danilovic, V. (2002) When the Stakes Are High: Deterrence and Conflict among Major Powers. Ann 
Arbor:University of Michigan Press 
• Democracy Now! (2011, March 7) “As public broadcasting and community media face potentially 
massive cuts at home, Hillary Clinton calls for increased funding for U.S. propaganda overseas” 
[video file]. Retrieved from 
http://www.democracynow.org/2011/3/7/as_public_broadcasting_and_community_media  
• Duque, M. (2018) “Recognizing International Status: A Relational Approach”. International Studies 
Quarterly, 0, 1-16 
• Durkheim, É. (1992 [orig. pub. 1913]) Professional Ethics and Civic Morals. London: Routledge 
• Egeland, J. (1984) “Focus On: Human Rights - Ineffective Big States, Potent Small States”, Journal 
of Peace Research, vol. 2 (3), 207-13 
• Gibert, M.; Grzelczyk, V. (2016) “Non-Western small states: activists or survivors?”, Third World 
Thematics: A TWQ Journal, vol1. (1), 1-8 
• Gilley, B.; O'Neil, A. (2014) “China's Rise through the Prism of Middle Powers”. In Gilley, B; 
O'Neil, A (ed.) Middle Powers and the rise of China, 1-44. Georgetown University Press 
• Gilpin, R. (1981), War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
• Government of the Republic of Rwanda (March 20, 2017) “Statement: President Kagame received 
by Pope Francis”. Retrieved from 
http://gov.rw/newsdetails2/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=1715&cHash=d2f4c91e30dac97abcb26
de7f5482458 
• Gvalia, G.; Siroky, D.; Lebanidze, B., and Iashvili, Z. (2013) “Thinking Outside the Bloc: 
Explaining the Foreign Policies of Small States”, Security Studies, 22:1, 98-131 
• Ibrahim, I.; Harrigan, F. (2012) “Qatar’s economy: Past, present and future”, QScience Connect, vol. 
9, 1-24 
• International Monetary Fund (1995) Singapore: a case study in rapid development. Edited by 
Bercuson, K. Washington: International Monetary Fund Publication Services 
• — (2018) IMF DataMapper. Retrieved from 
http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDPD@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD/Q
AT/SAU/ARE 
• Iyer, H. S.; Chukwuma, A.; Mugunga, J. C.; Manzi, A.; Ndayizigiye, M.; Anand, S. (2018). “A 
Comparison of Health Achievements in Rwanda and Burundi”. Health and Human Rights, vol. 
20 (1), 199-211 
• Kagame, P. (2014, April 7) “Speech by President Paul Kagame at the 20th Commemoration of the 
Genocide against the Tutsi”. Retrieved from: 
http://www.gov.rw/newsdetails2/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=642&cHash=757dfe82a3bb4c2b1f9bbc260
4186f81  
• Katzman, K. (2018) “Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy”, Congressional Research 
Service. Retrieved from https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R44533.pdf  
• Kamrava, M. (2013) Qatar. Small State, Big Politics, Ithaca: Cornell University Press 
• Kausikan, B. (2015, January 28) “Small? Become extraordinary”. The Straits Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/small-become-extraordinary 
• Keohane, R. (1969) “Lilliputians' Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics”, International 
Organization, vol. 23 (2), 291-310.  
• Koh, T. (2018, January 9) “Why Asean is good for Singapore”. The Sraits Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/why-asean-is-good-for-singapore 
• Kruizinga, S. (2016) “A Small State? The Size of the Netherlands as a Focal Point in Foreign Policy 
Debates, 1900-1940”, Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol. 27 (3), 420-436 
• Kwibuka, E. (June 28, 2016) “We refused to be a small failed state, says Kagame”, The New Times. 
Retrieved from https://www.newtimes.co.rw/profile/eugene-kwibuka 
• Lake, D. (2009) Hierarchy in International Relations. Ithaca: Cornell University Press 
• — (2014) “Status, Authority, and the End of the American Century”. In Paul, T.; Welch Larson, 
D.; Wohlforth, W. (eds.), Status in World Politics, 246-270. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 
• Larson, D.; Paul, T.; Wohlforth, C. (2014) “Status and World Order”. In Paul, T.V; Larson, D.; 
Wohlforth, C. (ed.) Status in World Politics, 3-29. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
• Larson, D.; Shevchenko, A. (2003) “Shortcut to Greatness: The New Thinking and the Revolution in 
Soviet Foreign Policy”, International Organization, vol. 57 (1), 77-10 
• — (2010) “Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to US Primacy” International 
Security, vol. 34 (4), 63-95 
• Lee, H.L. (2014, November 24) “Transcript of speech by prime minister Lee Hsien Loong at Smart 
Nation Launch”. Retrieved from: https://www.smartnation.sg/newsroom/speeches/smart-nation-
launch#sthash.8YbGPs6H.dpuf  
• Leong, H.K. (2000) “Prime ministerial leadership and policy‐ making style in Singapore: Lee Kuan 
Yew and Goh Chok Tong compared”, Asian Journal of Political Science, vol. 8 (1), 91-123 
• Maas, M. (2009) “The elusive definition of the small state”, International Politics, vol. 46, 65-83 
• Mahbubani, K. (July 1, 2017) “Qatar: Big lessons from a small country”, The Straits Times. 
Retrieved from https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/qatar-big-lessons-from-a-small-country 
• Massie, J. (2011) “Bandwagoning for status: Canada's need of the F-35”, Canadian Foreign Policy 
Journal, vol. 17 (3), 251-264 
• Matlary, J.H. (2002) “Verdidiplomati – kilde til makt?”, Maktutredningen (The Norwegian Power 
Study), n.46 
• Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore (2018) “Small States”. Retrieved from 
https://www1.mfa.gov.sg/SINGAPORES-FOREIGN-POLICY/International-Issues/Small-States 
• Mohammadzadeh, B. (2017) “Status and Foreign Policy Change in Small States: Qatar’s Emergence 
in Perspective”, The International spectator, vol. 52 (2), 19-36  
• Mouritzen, H.; Wivel, A. (2005) The geopolitics of Euro-Atlantic integration. London: Routledge 
• Neumann, I.; Gstöhl, S. (2006) “Lilliputians in Gulliver’s World? Small States in International 
Relations”. Centre for Small State Studies Institute of International Affairs - University of 
Iceland. Working Paper 1 
• Neumann, I.; De Carvalho, B. (2015) “Small states and status”. In Neumann, I.B; De Carvalho, B 
(ed.) Small state status seeking. Norway’s Quest for International Standing, 56-72. Abingdon, 
Oxon: Routledge 
• Nyandekwe, M.; Nzayirambaho, M.; Kakoma, J. (2014) “Universal Health Coverage in Rwanda: 
dream or reality”. The Pan African medical journal. vol. 17 (232) 
• Nye, J.S. (2004) Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs 
• Organski, A.F.K (1958), World Politics, New York: Knopf 
• Pedersen, R. (2017) “Bandwagon for Status: Changing Patterns in the Nordic States Status-seeking 
Strategies?”, International Peacekeeping, 1-25 
• Plourde, A. (2008) “The Origins of Prestige Goods as Honest Signals of Skill and Knowledge”. 
Human Nature, vol. 19 (4), 374–88 
• Pu, X.; Schweller, R. (2014) “Status signaling, multiple audiences, and China’s blue-water naval 
ambition”, in Paul, T.; Welch Larson, D.; Wohlforth, W. (eds.) Status in World Politics, 141-162. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
• Qatar General Secretariat for Development Planning (2011) Qatar National Development Strategy 
2011-2016. Doha: Gulf Publishing and Printing Company  
• Renshon, J. (2017) Fighting for Status: Hierarchy and Conflict in World Politics. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press 
• Republic of Rwanda. Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (2000) Rwanda Vision 2020. 
Kigali: Republic of Rwanda. Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 
• Røen, S.; Risvik, J.; De Carvalho, B (2010) “Utenriksministrene Thorvald Stoltenberg, Bjørn Tore 
Godal, Knut Vollebæk, Thorbjørn Jagland, Jan Petersen og Jonas Gahr Støre i samtale med Jan 
Egeland”, Internasjonal Politikk, vol. 68 (1), 89-114 
• Samuel-Azran, T.; Pecht, N. (2014) “Is there an Al-Jazeera–Qatari nexus? A study of Al-Jazeera’s 
online reporting throughout the Qatari–Saudi conflict”. Media, War & Conflict, vol. 7 (2), 218-
232 
• The Economist (2017, July 1) “Why Al Jazeera is under threat”, The Economist. Retrieved from: 
https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2017/07/01/why-al-jazeera-is-under-threat  
• The White House (2017, June 9) “Remarks by President Trump and President Iohannis of Romania 
in a Joint Press Conference”. Retrieved from https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-president-trump-president-iohannis-romania-joint-press-conference/ 
• — (2018a, January 26) “Remarks by President Trump and President Kagame of the Republic of 
Rwanda After Expanded Bilateral Meeting”. Retrieved from 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-president-kagame-
republic-rwanda-expanded-bilateral-meeting/ 
• — (2018b, April 10) “Remarks by President Trump and Amir Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani of the 
State of Qatar Before Bilateral Meeting”. Retrieved from: 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-amir-tamimbin-
hamad-al-thani-state-qatar-bilateral-meeting/ 
• — (2018c, June 12) “Press Conference by President Trump”. Retrieved from 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/press-conference-president-trump/ 
• The World Bank (2016) Doing Business 2016. Measuring Regulatory Quality and Efficiency. 
Washington:The World Bank 
• Thorhallsson, B.; Wivel, A. (2006) “Small States in the European Union: What Do We Know and 
What Would We Like to Know?”. Cambridge Review of International Affairs. vol. 19. 651-668 
• Thucydides, Warner, R.; In Finley, M. I. (1972). History of the Peloponnesian War. Harmondsworth, 
Eng: Penguin Books 
• Turnbull, C.M. (2009) A History of modern Singapore. Singapore: NUS Press 
• Waltz, K. (1979) Theory of International Politics, New York: Random House 
• — (1993) “The Emerging Structure of International Politics”, International Security, vol. 18 (2), 
44-79 
• Weber, M. (1978) Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press 
• Wohlforth, W.; De Carvalho, B.; Leira, H.; Neumann, I. (2017) “Moral authority and status in 
International Relations: Good states and the social dimension of status seeking”, Review of 
International Studies, 1-21 
